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IN THE

SUPREl~llE

COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH

NICKERSON PUMP & MACHINERY
CO., INC.,
Plaintiff,
Case No.
9353

vs.

STATE TAX COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Nature of the Case

This is an original proceeding, initiated pursuant to
59-15-14, 15 and 16 and 59-16-11- 13 UCA (1953), wherein
plaintiff challenges the validity of a deficiency tax assessment
imposed (R. 108, Ex. 1) and affirmed (R. 126-129) by
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defendant. 1 The assessment is based upon fourteen transactions
wherein plaintiff sold and emplaced water pumps for governmental units exempted from sales tax liability.
The primary issue is whether plaintiff is the consumer of
water pump assemblies sold and emplaced by it under contracts
specifying a single price for pump and emplacement. Defendant
says it is, and-as to parts of such assemblies-that plaintiff
should be charged with use or sales tax depending upon whether
title passed within or without Utah.

If this Court adopts defendant's position (thereby overruling, or at least modifying, past Utah decisions), two subsidiary issues arise: whether various items within the assessment
were correctly included; and whether defendant properly imposed penalties (including interest at 12% per annum). These
subsidiary issues will require consideration of areas in which
defendant's decision departs from stipulations at formal hearing.
By paragraph 3 of its petition for Writ of Certiorari and
for Review, plaintiff also has complained of evidentiary rulings
at formal hearing before defendant (note particularly R. 36-3 7,
74-76, 122, Ex. 15).
The amount of tax in question, while considerable, is not
staggering. Despite this, a decision favorable to defendant
would, as precedent, have important economic consequences.
In the short view, it would subject all other Utah water pump
lNo objection is lodged against the imposition of the sales tax specified at
Exhibit A, Schedule 1 of the deficiency notice, as amended, amounting to $56.00
plus interest; as to such segment, however, plaintiff protests the imposition of
penalties (including interest at 12% per annum). It will be noted that the
credit to plaintiff for bad de~ts exceeds the tax deficiency hereby conceded. If
bad debts are set-off only agamst tax deficiencies arising in the same year the
conceded deficiency is $4.84 plus interest at 6% per annum.
'

12
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dealers to deficiency assessments-complete with interest and
penalties-of the type here challenged. 2 Patently, this would
constitute, in arid Utah, a large sum. The gain to the State
would be diminished somewhat by the cost of auditing the
books of other dealers and by claims for refund of sales tax
erroneously collected by such dealers from private lump-sum
buyers on the assumption that the buyers were consumers. In
the long term, the revenue of the State would be reduced.
Governmental units would insist that separate contracts be
entered into for, respectively, sale and emplacement. Otherwise, the cost to the unit would be increased by the cost of
the sales and use tax paid by the dealer; that cost, of course,
would be passed on to any lump-sum public buyer. 3 But private
persons would insist that water pump purchases be made under
lump-sum contracts. In this manner, they would absorb only
the tax paid by the dealer and passed on to them rather than
the tax on the sales price to them. This would afford private
buyers an advantage in that their actual cost would be reduced
by the amount of the sales and use tax percentage (currently
2% or 2V2%) times the dealer's mark-up over wholesale.
Plaintiff has assigned (Petition for Writ of Certiorari and
for Review, par. 3) as error the incompleteness of defendant's
findings (R. 126-128), and ~ the fact that they express bare
ultimate conclusions of law. It is apparent from their reading
2Defendant excluded some evidence of trade practice (R. 36-37, 74-75, 122,
Ex. 15). The testimony of witnesses Nickerson, Richards, Templeton and Hilbert
however, establishes that there has been uniform treatment by the industry (R:
66-67, 68-69, 72, 77-78, 95). If there be any doubt of this, it is negated by the
firm assurances of public buyers that tax payments were not requisite (R. 4446, 74, 109-110, Ex. 2-3; R. 118-119, Ex. 11-12), which assurances seemingly
were buttressed by the then practical interpretation of defendants (R. 63, 97-98).
3Such procedure has been used subsequent to service of the instant assessment
(R. 47).

·3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and a comparison of them with plaintiff's pleading (R. 13-16)
that such findings do not approach adequacy, see Thomas v.
Farrell, 82 Utah 535, 26 P.2d 328, 330 (1936); 73 C.J.S.J
Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure §152 at page 486.
Inasmuch as full appellate understanding of the questions
presented may be had from a reading of the pleadings and
record, plaintiff does not urge that remand to defendant for
proper findings is requisite, 5 Moore's Federal Practice 2662-64.
The true significance of the inadequacy of defendant's
findings is that they are reflective of the inadequacy of defendant's determination.

2.
Evidentiary Facts of Record

At formal hearing, defendant produced two witnesses,
Paul M. Holt, its chief auditor, (R. 20-29) and A. C. Goates,
its audit supervisor, (R. 97-98). Plaintiff called an adverse
witness, William H. Buttalph, the commission auditor initially
responsible for the instant deficiency assessment, (R. 30-41).
Plaintiffs case-in-chief consisted of the testimony, largely
stipulated, of R. H. Nickerson, its president, (R. 41-66; R.
75-97), A. Z. Richards, Sr. (R. 66-70) and Win Templeton
(R. 70-73), both civil engineers specializing in the development
of water wells and whose firms were responsible for the drawing
of specifications for a substantial proportion of the sales here
in question, and of Robert Hilbert, manager of the Salt Lake
County Water Conservancy District, (R. 73-74). In addition,
17 exhibits were admitted, one rejected (R. 108-125).
The facts elicited were, in large measure, undisputed. In

4
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those cases where dispute, real or imagined, existed, plaintiff
will support its recitation by footnote.
Plaintifi and its predecessor sole proprietorship and partnership have been in the business for about thirty-six years. It is
a dealer in pumping and allied equipment, specializing in water
pumps. At all times here important, it held a Utah retail sales
license (R. 42).
Three types of pumps are sold by it: submersible deep
well pumps, deep well line shaft pumps, and booster pumps
(R. 47). The former two types service wells which range in
depth up to 1,000 feet; the wells in question are between 400
and 700 feet deep (R. 78). A pamphlet regarding submersible
deep well pumps was introduced as Exhibit 7 (R. 114). Their
distinguishing characteristic is that their motor is below water
level, at the end of the pump shaft (R. 49) . A pamphlet
regarding deep well line shaft pumps was introduced as Exhibit 6 (R. 113) . Their distinguishing characteristic is that
their motor is on the top of the pump, at or about ground
level (R. 49). Such pumps will produce from 200 to 4,500
gallons of culinary water per minute (R. 78, 92). Such pumps,
including their extension pipes, range in weight from 700
pounds up to eighteen tons (R. 81) . The deep well line shaft
may be either water or oil cooled (R. 80-81). A pamphlet
regarding booster pumps was introduced as Exhibit 9 (R. 116).
While the purpose of deep well pumps is to bring water from
a well to a water line, the purpose of a booster pump is to
give pressure to the water as it goes thorugh the line (R. 52) .
The booster pump is connected to the pipes at ground level
(R. 52, 116, Ex. 9, p. 7). Plaintiff assembles booster pumps
prior to emplacement (R. 51).
5
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Because of the weight and bulk of the pumps, buyers are
unable to emplace them in wells. As a "necessary evil" of the
business of selling pumps, plaintiff emplaces them in the
majority of instances. Plaintiff owns and operates a crane for
the purpose of emplacing deep well pumps. Emplacement is
not a profit item, being done at cost. Those of plaintiff's competitors who do not have the facilities for emplacement hire
subcontractors to do so (R. 43, 73, 77-78).
Plaintiff and its competitors sell and emplace both for
public and private buyers. Some 70% of plaintiff's sales are
to private individuals. In none of its dealings, private or public,
is there an express agreement as to whether the pump assembly,
after emplacement, will be realty or personalty (R. 75-76).
The security device used by plaintiff on private sales is the
title retaining or conditional sales contract, under which it
has effected repossessions. It has never filed a mechanic's lien
(R. 44,75). Both plaintiff and its competitors charge sales
tax to private persons. When a lump sum contract is used,
sales tax on the entire amount, including installation, is charged
private buyers, as required by defendant's regulations (R. 43-44,
46-47, 67-68, 102-105). Auditor Buttloph did not object to
plaintiffs method of dealing with private contracts, although
the collection of sales tax, rather than the payment of use
tax, on plaintiff's lump sum contracts with private buyers would
be improper under defendant's theory. 4
4Defenda~t may disp_ute this statem~nt. Although auditor Buttalph's testimony
was, admrttedly, evasrv: and co_ntradrctory, the following is dear: (a) according
to bot~ Buttalph_ a~d. hrs supenor, Holt, Buttalph _covered_ all public and private
sales nles of plamtlff ( R. 24, 30-31) ; (b) plamtrff has tiled no use tax return
(R:· 31-32, 34) _; (c) according to Bu_tto.lph, plaintiff owed no tax upon its
pnv_a~e transactwns (R. 33, ~5). Plamtdf concludes that auditqr Buttalph's
aud1t111g en~eavors were practtcal, not c<?nceptualistic, that the test employed
was one of mcreased revenue rather than mcreased consistency, and that auditor

6
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Plaintiff's contracts with public buyers likewise are both
separate and lump sum (R. 44, 90). In this connection it will
be noted that defendant amended its assessment to delete
certain non lump sum contracts (R. 108, Ex. 1, page 4), and
that one of the sales here involved, Midvale City, No. 8833,
was not under a lump sum contract (R. 60-61). Plaintiff,
considering that the buyer-not it-consumes pumps, and in
view of the fact that public buyers are exempt from sales tax,
has not charged sales tax to such buyers nor has it paid use
tax (R. 44).
The usual chronology of plaintiff's sales is as follows:
1. The engineer for the buyer, public or private, prepares

an invitation to bid and specifications, outlining in detail the
type or types of pumps needed, and whether or not a lump
sum bid is sought (R. 46, 66, 70, 79). Examples of specifications appear as Exhibits 3, 16 and 17 (R. 110, 123-124).
2. Plaintiff bids according to the specifications. Prior to

making its bid, plaintiff prepares a computation sheet which
is retained in its files. This computation sheet shows clearly
the cost of labor added to the bid. This cost, not a profit item,
is computed on the basis of $90.00 per day, for the emplacing
equipment and a crew of two to three men. This cost is not
a variable item-expected profit, not cost items such as emplacement, are reduced if competition demands (R. 43, 46-47,
90-91).
3. If the contract is awarded it, plaintiff then orders the
specified pumps and ancillary equipment from its suppliers.
Buttolph's activities and testimony are an example of "the edacious minotaur,
tax", referred to in a recent dissenting opinion, Pender v. Alix, .... Utah ----,
354 P.2d 1066, 1070 (1960).

7
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Plaintiff normally does not store pumps. All such suppliers
either are wholesalers or supply plaintiff at wholesale prices.
Byron Jackson deep well and Aurora booster pumps are specialty
goods, manufactured to specification. The goods are shipped
either to plaintiff or the well site. Except for Cutler Hammer,
shipping costs are prepaid by the seller. Byron Jackson specifies
that title passes f.o.b. factory, California, but no other seller
specifies where or when title passes. Resale certificates are
given in-state sellers, but not out-of-state sellers (R. 55, 93-95).
4. Prior to emplacement of deep well pumps, the buyer,
acting individually or through an independent contractor other
than plaintiff, digs and lines the water well with casing (R. 47,
49, 78-79) . The cost of the buyer's digging the wells, defendant's counsel elicited, is $1.10 to $1.20 per foot per inch
of diameter (R. 78). The buyer, not plaintiff, also builds a
concrete foundation around the mouth of the well, and builds
a water line extending toward the pump (R. 47-48, 81, 82).
Exhibits 4 and 5 show a water well prepared for emplacement
(R. 48, 111-112).
5. In the emplacement of a deep well pump, plaintiffs
crane lowers it and its pipe into the prepared well. As the
pump base or platform reaches the prepared foundation,
plaintiff is careful to align it, making it plumb. This is done
by grouting the foundation with cement to even it. Plaintiff
lubricates the pump base or platform so that it will not be
cemented to the foundation, such cementing being "the last
thing you would want." If a submersible pump is used, a
specially prepared cable is also lowered into the well to furnish
power to the motor. If a well is flowing, tending to seep,
8
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the pump platform is bolted to a flange attached to the well
casing, thereby "sealed." This is not done if the well does not
flow. On occasion, plaintiff bolts an electric panel to a near-by
wall and attaches the pump's cable to it; all pumps here
involved use electric power. The outlet of the pump is attached,
perhaps by a metal band, to the buyer's main (R. 48-51, 81-86,
93, 95) . Exhibits 6-8 illustrate the emplacement of pumps
(R. 113-115).
6. A booster pump is emplaced and bolted on a cement
foundation and attached to pipes prepared for its connection
by the buyer (R. 51-52). Exhibit 9, page 7 illustrates an emplaced booster pump (R. 51, 116).
7. The engineers in charge supervise the emplacement

of all pumps (R. 67, 70). The pumps, after emplacement,
retain their identity as pumps (R. 55- 56).
8. Plaintiff does not ever use the pump to pump water.
The buyer does this (R. 54).

Detailed descriptions of each transaction here involved
are contained at R. 56-63. Each, except Midvale City, No.
8833, was performed under a lump sum contract; the exception
concerns a pump sold without any agreement whatever for
emplacement, and an agreement three months later that plaintiff
would emplace such pump (R. 60-61, 120, Ex. 13). On the
lump sum contracts, plaintiff's computation sheets show that
the percentage of labor cost in the contract price ranged from
2.7% (Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District deep
well line shaft 10703, R. 62) to 6.8% (Logan City Corporation,
9282, R. 62). The following transactions involved submersible
deep well pumps in non-flowing wells which, therefore, were
9
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not bolted to a flange: Midvale City, 8271; Tooele, 8603;
Metropolitan Water District, 92 37. The following transactions
involved submersible pumps which were so bolted: University
of Utah, 8541; Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District,
8921; City of Fillmore, 9164; Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District, 9067; South Salt Lake City, 10481. The
following transactions involved deep well line shaft pumps,
all so bolted: Town of North Salt Lake, 8596; Salt Lake
County Water Conservancy District, 10703. The following
transactions involved booster pumps: Salt Lake County Water
Conservancy District, 8921; Logan City Corporation, 9282;
Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District 10703.
Plaintiffs case was, thus, presented by the testimony or
stipulated testimony of representatives of the parties to the
usual transaction of sale, the dealer (Mr. Nickerson), the
buyer (Mr. Hilbert) and the consulting engineer (Mr. Richards
and Mr. Templeton). The testimony of each was demonstrative
of the fact that the parties do not, and could not reasonably,
intend that pump assemblies become permanent additions
to the well, the pipes or to the realty upon which they are
situate (R. 53-54, 67-68, 71-74, 79-80, 86-87). First, pumps
are quite often removed for repair. Such repair is not at all
unusual in this area, where wells tend to be sandy. It is impossible to repair any deep well or the motor of a submersible
without removing the pump from the well. The surface motor
of a line shaft pump may be repaired while the pump remains
in the well. Repair is more likely for the pump than for the
motor inasmuch as the pump's bearings, spaced every ten feet,
are subjected to considerable wear. Assuming optimum conditions (no sandy or hard water), seldom extant in Utah,
10
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the maximum life of a pump is 20 years. It is recommended
that, even though no difficulty is apparent in its operation, a
deep well pump be removed every 5-7 years for a preventive
maintenance check (R. 53, 67, 71, 73, 79-80, 86-87). Secondly,
deep well pumps are removed when repair to the well or well
lining is required (R. 53, 673). Third, pumps are removed
when the well's potential is exhausted (R. 71). Fourth, pumps
are removed when it is desired to develop the facility in
question to its full potential. It is usual for a well to be
developed by the engineer in charge to a given potential and
to emplace a pump with a lesser potential. This is because the
area to be served may not, at the time of emplacement, have
need for the well's full potential. As the need increases, the
former pump is removed, and either used elsewhere or traded
in. A given well can receive various sized pumps. An example
of this procedure is JMidvale City, No. 8276, one of the transactions here in question (R. 53-54, 56, 67, 71, 74, 95). Fifth,
if the user has more than one facility, pumps are removed
and interchanged to make use more fully of the potential of
all facilities (R. 54, 71, 74). The need for removal is equivalent
as between deep well and booster pumps (R. 72).
In view of the frequency of pump removal, water engineers
such as Mr. Richards and Mr. Templeton design projects to
facilitate pump removal (R. 67, 71). If a pumphouse is
erected before or after the emplacement of the pump, it is
invariably 5 designed with a hatch to facilitate emplacement
5
Auditor Buttolph, who professed knowledge of the pumping business, although
he hadn't visited the sites in question, or interviewed the engineers or buyers
involved in the subject transactions, would prefer the word "sometimes" (R.
35-38). L will be remembered, in evaluating his credibility, that it is Buttalph's
assessment which is in question.

11
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and removal (R. 52, 67, 71). No damage is caused to the
real estate when the pump is removed, and it or a replacement
pump may be emplaced in the same manner as were the well
virgin. An example, once again, is Midvale City, No. 8276.
Removal consists of unbolting and lifting the pump; the only
thing broken is, perhaps, an inexpensive band on the connection
between the pump and the water main (R. 54, 56, 67-68).
Exhibit 10 illustrates the removal of a pump from a pump
house (R. 53, 117}.
In order to avoid duplication, the testimony of defendant's
witnesses as to the propriety of penalties (including 12%
per annum interest) will be deferred until the appropriate
portion of plaintiff's argument, as will defendant's departure
from two at-hearing stipulated amendments to the deficiency
assessment.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. Plaintiff does not consume pumps.
II. Penalties were improperly assessed.
III. Certain items of the assessment were incorrectly
imposed.

ARGUMENT

I.
PLAINTIFF DOES NOT CONSUME PUMPS.
A.
BOTH SALES TAX AND USE TAX ARE TAXES ON THE CONSUMER.

12
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Sales tax is a levy upon the consumer of personal property,
E. C. Olsen Co. v. State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563, 168
P 2d 324, 326 ( 1946). So is use tax, 59-16-3, UCA ( 195 3).
The two taxes are correlative and complementary, the latter
having been passed for the purpose of removing "the theretofore existing discrimination in favor of out-of-state merchants,"
Union Portland Cement Company v. State Tax Commission,
110 Utah 135, 170 P. 2d 164 ( 1946), modified on rehearing,
110 Utah 152, 176 P. 2d 879, 881 (1947); Geneva Steel Co.
v. State Tax Commission, 116 Utah 170, 209 P. 2d 208 ( 1949).
If goods are purchased in-state by a consumer, the sales tax
applies, see Western Leather & Finding Co. v. Sales Tax Commission, 87 Utah 227, 48 P. 2d 526 ( 1935). If goods are
purchased out-of-state by an in-state consumer and no tax is
owing or has been paid previously, the use tax applies, Ford
f. Twaits Co. v. State Tax Commission, 106 Utah 343, 148
P. 2d 343 (1944).
The key term is "consumer." 6 If plaintiff, in sale and
emplacement, is a consumer, it should pay tax on materials
to be consumed-sales tax if title to the materials passes to
it in this state, use tax if title passes out of state. If a private
buyer of a pump assembly is the consumer, he should pay
sales tax. If a public buyer of a pump assembly is the consumer,
no tax is paid because of the exemption provided by 59-15-6
6We are not here concerned with the sales tax on certain "services," 59-15-4
(b)(1) (2) (e) (f) (g), UCA (1959 Supp.), a fact of which defendant's counsel
at hearing apparently was not fully aware (R. 77). Nor does plaintiff, in this
case, dest*:e the power of the legislature to impose a tax upon any "service" it
may perform in the emplacement of pump assemblies, Howe v. Tax Commission,
10 Utah 2d 362, 353 P.2d 468 (1960); Francom v. State Tax Commission,
No. 9271 (Utah, 1960). Plaintiff simply contends that it is not a consumer
within the meaning of the tax laws currently applicable to its business.
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UCA (1953) as implemented by Sales Tax Regulation 54
(R. 103-104).
Put another way: if, in the transactions here involved,
plaintiff consumed the pump assemblies 7 in question, it is
subject to sales or use tax, whether the buyer is private or
public. If, on the other hand, the buyer is the consumer, private
buyers should pay sales tax (to be collected by the seller) and
public buyers should pay no tax at all.

B.
UTAH DECISIONS PROVIDE DEFINITION OF THE TERM "CONSUMER."

On three occasions since legislative imposition of the sales
tax, L. 1933, ch. 63, this Court has had occasion to define the
meaning of the term "consumer," Western Leather & Finding
Co., supra; Utah Concrete Products Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 513, 125 P.2d 408 (1942); Union Portland
Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 110 Utah 135, 170
P.2d 164 ( 1946), two of which were decided after enactment
of the original use tax, L. 193 7, ch. 114.
In Western Leather & Finding Co., defendant had assessed
plaintiff with sales tax liability for leather and shoe findings
sold by it to Utah shoe repairers. After noting that plaintiff
was liable only if the repairers were "consumers," this Court
turned, at 48 P.2d 528, to Webster's New International Dictionary for the definition of "consume":
7The process of assembling the pumps from component parts is a "manufacturing" or "ccnnpounding for sale" within the meaning of 59-15-2 and 59-16-4,
UCA (1953), hence not taxable as consumption.
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"1. To destroy the substance of, esp. by fire;-formerly and still figuratively used of any destructive or
wasting process, as evaporation, decomposition, and
disease. 2. To spend wastefully; hence, to use up;
expend; waste. 3. To use up (time) whether wastefully or usefully; as, hours consumed in reading. 4. To
eat or drink up (food); devour. 5. To waste or burn
away; to perish. Syn.-absorb, spend, squander, dissipate."

It was then held:
"A person who places shoes, heels, and patches on
old shoes does not consume material within the definitions above quoted or within the meaning of the
statute. The consumer is the person who wears the
shoes after they are repaired.''
In Utah Concrete Products Corp., sale tax was held to be
applicable to purchases by road and building contractors from
a supplier of concrete pipe, cinder blocks and related products.
Such pipe, blocks and products were incorporated "as one of
many units which go to make up buildings, structures, or roads,"
id at 125 P. 2d 410. This Court noted that the road and
building contractors did not purchase the products
"for reselling them as such in their original form,
but for the purpose of changing their very nature from
personal to real property. In short, labor and many
other materials enter along with the plaintiffs' (the
suppliers') products to make up the particular structure,
and they are all used or consumed in the process of
producing a new entity." id. (Emphasis supplied).
This Court held, therefore, that road and building " (c) ontractors are consumers within the meaning of our act because
they are the last persons in the chain to deal with such products
15
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before incorporation into a separate entity and before such
products lost their identity as such ... " id at 125 P. 2d 411.

(Emphasis supplied).
In Union Portland Cement Co.} a plaintiff-manufacturer
was held to be liable for use tax on iron grinding balls, firebrick and coal utilized in the manufacture of plaintiffs products.
This Court, speaking through the same Justice as in Utah Concrete Products Corp. in answer to the problem of who was the
consumer cited the definition from Webster's relied upon in
Western Leather & Finding} supra. Also quoted, at 170 P.2d
171, was 9 Words and Phrases} Permanent Edition 10 delineating a "consumer" as: "one who uses economic goods and so
diminishes or destroys their utilities; opposed to producer;
and 'consume' means to use up, expend, waste, devour, with
synonyms destroy, swallow up, engulf, absorb, waste, exhaust,
spend, expend, squander, lavish, dissipate, burn up." Liability
was imposed because the materials in question were worn away
in the manufacturing process.
Although the Legislature has devoted regular attention
to the sales and use tax acts, amending the definitions sections
by L. 1933 (2nd SS), ch. 20; L. 1935, ch. 91; L. 1937, ch.
110; L. 1939 ch. 103; L. 1943, ch. 92; L. 1949, ch. 83; L. 1955,
ch. 126; L. 1957, ch. 125, 128, it has not deemed it requisite
to modify this Court's understanding of the meaning of the term
·'consumer.''

C.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A CONSUMER OF PUMPS-BUYERS FROM IT
ARE.

16
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A cursory reading of the statement of evidentiary facts
demonstrates that plaintiff, in the transactions in question, was
not a consumer.
By the test enunciated by Webster, and reflected by Western Leather & Finding Co. and Union Portland Cement Co.,
plaintiff did not consume the pumps in question. By definition,
a water pump pumps water. That is its purpose, its use, its
reason for existence. Plaintiff does not pump water from the
water pump it emplaces (R. 54). In consequence, plaintiff
does not, in emplacing: ( 1) destroy the substance of a pump;
(2) spend the pump; (3) use up the pump; ( 4) devour the
pump; (5) waste the pump. It is the buyer (in these transactions, a public body) which, through its use of the water
pump to pump water, causes the substance of the pump to
be destroyed, spends the pump, uses up the pump, devours
the pump and wastes the pump. A water pump of the type
here involved has a maximum useful life of 20 years (R. 79) .
Its use, in the well in which emplaced or in other wells, starts
after, does not end with, emplacement.
By the test enunciated by Words and Phrases and reflected
by Union Portland Cement Company, plaintiff is, for like
reason, not a consumer. Plaintiff, by emplacement, is not
"one who uses economic goods and so diminishes or destroys
their utilities." Quite the contrary. Plaintiff, in emplacing
pumps, activates their utilities-a water pump out of water
has no utility. The utility of a water pump is destroyed in 20
years at most, through use by the buyer. Equally, plaintiff, in
emplacing the pump, does not use it up, expend it, waste it,
devour it, destroy it, swallow it up, engulf it, absorb it, waste
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it, exhaust it, spend it, expend it, squander it, lavish it, dissipate
it, or burn it up. There is no evidence that plaintiff does so.
There is every evidence that the buyer from plaintiff, through
its utilization of it, does so. Utah Portland Cement Company
is instructive, it should be added, for its analogy of the iron
grinding balls, firebrick and coal there involved to manufacturing machinery, id at 170 P.2d 172. It is patent that this
Court there considered that machinery was consumed in its
use as machinery and not in its emplacement in the manufacturing plant.
By the test enunciated in Utah Concrete Products Corp.,
plaintiff did not consume the pumps in question. Pumps are
not, as are pipe, blocks and like products incorporated "as
one of many units which go to make up buildings, structures
or roads,'' changed in their very nature. They are sold as pumps.
They remain pumps. They are not permanently incorporated into
the well. As contrasted with products going into a roadway,
wear on the pump does not directly affect the well. On this,
the testimony is undisputed. ( 1) Pumps are quite often removed
for repair to the pump. ( 2) Pumps are removed for repair of
the well. ( 3) Pumps are removed when a well's potential is
exhausted. ( 4) Pumps are removed when another pump is to
be emplaced in order to develop the well's potential to its
fullest. ( 5) Pumps are removed to exchange them with other
pumps. At most, the life span of a pump is 20 years, and in
Utah probably much less (by way of illustration, a common
law adverse possessor taking possession of a well one week
after the emplacement of a pump, would not own the well
before the pump-if it were allowed to remain-was spent;
lest one think of statutory adverse possession, let it be remem-
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bereJ that it is recommended that pumps be removed at least
every five to seven years for preventive maintenance) . These
are not mere possibilities of removal. Removal is sufficiently
probable that consulting engineers plan wells and pumphouses
to facilitate removal (R. 52, 67, 71). In emplacement, pumps
do not lose their identity as such. They are not incorporated
into a separate entity. Emplacement is certainly not for the
purpose of changing the very nature of pumps from personal
to real property in the process of producing a new entity. Once
again the matter of planned removability arises. Engineers
plan for it, plaintiff plans for it (taking care, for instance, to
lubricate the pump platform so that it will not stick to the
cement grouting on the foundation-R. 83), and the buyer
plans for it (anticipating the trading in or exchange of pumps) .
It follows that pumps, through emplacement, are not .. used
or consumed in the process of producing a new entity," id at
125 P.2d 410.8 Plaintiff is not a consumer.
Plaintiff is aware that the conclusions (labeled findings)
of defendant's decision purport to determine that it is a consumer. Such conclusions are at odds with the undisputed
evidentiary facts. The language of Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture,
6 Utah 2d 385, 314 P.2d 842, 846 (1957), is appropriate:
"Notwithstanding the fact that considerable tolerance must
SAuditor Buttolph hazarded that a pump was much like a window or a door.
Although no evidence as to the reasons for removing windows was presented,
Auditor Buttolph suggested that they would be removed more often than would
pumps (R. 39). It is suggested that, in his testimony to this effect, Auditor
Buttolph was, in the common experience of reasonable men, ( 1) mistaken;
(2) experiencing a temporary mental lapse. His analogy of working machinery
to doors and windows is for instance most peculiar when one considers the need
for repairs alone. How many windows and doors are traded in? How many
windows and doors are exchanged from one opening to another? Few, if any.
But the uncontradicted testimony of experts is that these are common experiences
with pumps.
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be indulged in favor of the findings of the trial court because
of its advantaged position in immediate contact with the trial
and the parties, it nevertheless may not obdurately refuse to
find facts which are established by credible and uncontradicted
evidence." What was true in Fuller is doubly true here, where
the evidence was largely a result of stipulated testimony and
where the ":finder" was, in reality, the adverse party.

D.
PLAINTIFF EMPLACES PUMPS AT COST.

The undisputed evidence is that plaintiff's emplacement
of pumps is not a profit item, but rather is done at cost as a
necessary evil of its business. The pumps are of considerable
size and buyers (even one of the importance of Salt Lake
County Water Conservancy District) do not have the truck
and crane necessary for emplacement and removal.
It is well established that the primary nature of a concern's
business, not incidental factors entering into the conduct of
such business, will determine tax liability. Thus in Washington
Printing & Binding Co. v. State, 192 Wash. 448, 73 P.2d 1326
(1937), the Washington Supreme Court held that the taxpayer, a printer, performed essentially a service although the
state argued that it was "selling" the products of its presses.
In Young Electric Sign Co. v. State Tax Commission, 4 Utah
2d 242, 291 P.2d 900 ( 1955), this Court ruled that, where an
electric company's total charges for repairs to signs now owned
by it included parts and material costing such company only
6% of the total bill, such furnishing of parts and materials
was incidental and the service charges, including the cost of
20
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parts and materials, were not subject to sales tax. In !vic Kendrick
·v. Stc~te Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 418, 347 P.2d 177 (1959),
this Court affirmed the determination of defendant that the
services of an artificial limb manufacturer were incidental to
the sale of such limbs.
In the instant case, it is obvious that the service performed
by plaintiff is incidental to its business of selling pumps. No
particular skill, just manual labor, is required in emplacement.
Emplacement is performed at cost as a "necessary evil" of
the business. A very small percentage of the total sales price
(2.7% to 6.8%) is attributable to emplacement cost.
From computation sheets prepared by plaintiff prior to
bid, the cost of the labor item can be readily ascertained. Defendant's apparent emphasis upon lump sum contracts 1s,
therefore, highly unrealistic.
Plaintiff submits, therefore, that any service performed by
it is at cost and is merely incidental to its primary business of
selling pumps.9

E.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT A CONSUMER UNDER DEFENDANT'S REGULATIONS.

1.

Defendant Lacks Power to Impose Tax on a Non-Consumer.

It is dubious that, in view of exhaustive judicial treatment
of the meaning of the term "consumer," defendant should or
9Evcn were it otherwise, it must be remembered that there is no excise tax

on emplacement services.
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could regulate thereon. Defendant has taken it upon itself
so to do, however. Interestingly enough, its pride of authorship
seemingly is such that its decision avoids citation of this Court's
decisions, substituting therefor its own regulation.
By the seventh finding of its decision, citing present Sales
Tax Regulation 58, defendant apparently indicates reliance
upon its regulations to support imposition of sales and use
tax liability upon a non-consumer. It is plaintiff's position
that, even under the regulations promulgated by defendant,
it is not liable.
It must be kept tn mind however that the Legislature,

not defendant, has the power to define the subjects of taxation.
In Western Leather & Finding Co., at 48 P.2d 528, it was
stated:
"The Legislature is not permitted to abdicate or
transfer to others the essential legislative function with
which it is ... vested. The imposition of a tax and the
designation of those who must pay the same is such
an essential legislative function as may not be transferred to others. . . . The commission is empowered
merely to make rules and regulations, etc., in conformity with the act."
In Utah Concrete Products Corp., at 125 P.2d 412, this
Court stated:
"(T)he interpretation placed on the language of
the statute by the Tax Commission must not do
·violence to its apparent meaning. . . . Government
agencies cannot deprive the courts of their judicial
functions nor can t~e. age~cies extend the operation of
the statute by admtntstratlve findings."
22
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In point is Washington Printing & Binding Co. v. State,
supra. A printer, who printed tariffs for a railroad bureau, was
held to perform a "service" and not to be engaged in retail
selling. A Washington Tax Commission collection therefore
was refunded. The state argued that its Tax Commission had
a regulation which expressly specified that the transactions in
question were subject to sales tax. The Washington Supreme
Court replied at 73 P.2d 1328:
"The Tax Commission cannot, by such rule, impose
a tax upon property or a transaction that is not mentioned as being taxable. The rule making power is
given only for the purpose of empowering the commission to carry out the provisions of the statute."
Plaintiff may not, by regulation, make a "consumer" in
law out of one who is not a consumer in fact. It may be that
the imposition of a fictional standard would .be wise. Be that
as it may, defendant is not empowered to enact such a standard.

2.
The Commission's Regulations Do Not Apply Retroactively

Attention is directed to the rule set forth at 73 C.J.S. Public
Administt'ative Bodies and Procedure, § 107, pp. 429-30. It
is there noted that, aside from the issue of whether an agency
may promulgate retroactive regulations:

" (A) n administrative rule or regulation will not be
construed to operate retrospective! y where the intention
to that effect does not unequivocably appear .... Even
though an administrative agency is not bound by the
rule of res judicata . . . , it is bound to recognize the
validity of a rule of conduct prescribed by it, and not
to repeal its own enactment with retroactive effect."
23
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As has been noted, the regulation cited at paragraph 7
of plaintiff's findings became effective on July 1, 1959 (R.
106-107). The last date of the instant deficiency assessment,
is June 30, 1959 (R. 108). Prior thereto the text of Regulation
58 (R. 104-106) was as follows:
MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES SOLD BY OWNERS,
CONTRACTORS AND REP AIRMEN OF REAL PROPERTY
(APPLIES TO SALES AJ\JD USE TAXES) .-Such sales may
be classified as follows:
I. To owners-sales are taxable-such sales are to final
buyers and not for resale;

II. To contractors and subcontractors for use by them in
fulfilling contracts for erecting, building on, or otherwise
improving, altering or repairing the real property of others:
A. Where the contractor agrees for a lump sum to furnish
the materials, supplies and necessary services, the sale to him
of the materials and supplies is taxable as he becomes the
consumer thereof or final buyer. Cost plus contracts are regarded
as lump sum contracts for the purpose of this regulation. The
above holding is true regardless of with whom the contract is
drawn whether it be a governmental instrumentality or otherwise. In connection with government contracts the following
exemptions exist:
1. Where the contract provides that title to the materials
purchased shall vest in the government or instrumentality
thereof prior to its use in the construction, the purchase by
the contractor shall be deemed a purchase for resale and the
contractor shall be required to obtain a sales tax license.
2. Sales to contractors who are authorized by the United
States Government or an instrumentality thereof to make
purchases in the name of the government or instrumentality
thereof are deemed to be sales to an agent of the United States
government or the instrumentality thereof and are, therefore,
exempt from tax.
24
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Governmental contractors claiming exemption from any
purchases made pursuant to their contract must secure a clearance from the state tax commission prior to making such
purchase. Supply houses should collect tax on all sales to
contractors unless the contractor gives an exemption certificate
and stipulates that proper clearance has been secured from the
state tax commission.
B. Where the contractor agrees to furnish the material
and supplies at a fixed price or at the regular retail price and
to render the services either for an additional agreed price or
on the basis of time consumed, the sale to him of materials and
supplies is for resale and not subject to the tax. The contractor
then becomes the retailer and the sale by him to the owner
is a taxable sale. In this event the final buyer is the person
whose property is improved, altered or repaired, and the sale
is made at the time the contract or job is completed and accepted
by the property owner.
In case a contractor enters into both of the above kinds of
contracts, he shall be deemed to be a retailer or tangible personal property and shall register with the state tax commission,
obtain a sales tax license, purchase all materials for resale
and report his liability direct to the state tax commission.
Contractors and repairmen who enter into
repair work of the type referred to herein include
as building, electrical, plumbing, paper hanging,
bridge, road, landscape, excavating, roofing, or
tractors or repairmen.

contracts or
such persons
sheet metal,
similar con-

Contractors or repairmen in no case should give a resale
certificate when they purchase materials, supplies, equipment
or other articles for their own use and consumption. Such
purchases, which would include fuel, cement mixers, trucks,
tractors or other machinery and equipment, are taxable to the
seller thereof.
This regulation is not applicable to contracts whereby the
retailer merely agrees to sell and install a complete unit of
25
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equipment under conditions whereby such unit does remain
a chattel. In such instances the contract will not be regarded
as one for improving, altering or repairing real property. For
example, the maker of an awning or blinds agrees not only
to sell them but to hang them; an electrical shop sells electrical
fixtures and agrees to attach them; a dealer sells draperies and
window shades and agrees to install them; a retailer sells an
oil burner or heating equipment and contracts to install the
same; a dealer sells linoleum and agrees to lay it; a cabinet
maker sells show cases, counters and cabinets and agrees to
install them; a retailer sells a sprinkling system and contracts
to intall it. A person performing such contracts is primarily
a retailer of tangible personal property and should segregate
the full retail selling price of such property from the charge
for installation, as the tax applies only to the retail price of the
property. If such retailer fails to make such segregation on the
customer's invoice, the sales tax applies to the entire contract
price including the installation charge. In no case will the retail
price be deemed less than such person charges for similar
materials and supplies to another installer.
Persons engaged in the foregoing types of business shall
register with the state tax commission, obtain a sales tax license
and report their liability directly to the state tax commission.

If defendant's erroneous recitation of an impertinent text
was intentional, it may have been because it wished to avoid
the effect of the last paragraphs of the pertinent text. This
would not be accomplished, however, even were the present
regulations applicable. The restriction of Regulation 58 led,
effective the same date--July 1, 1959-to the expansion of
Regulation 51. At all times here in question, Regulation 51
related to fabrication and machine work and had nothing to
do with the issues at hand (R. 102). On July 1, 1959, it was
expanded to cover not only fabrication, but also "Installation
Labor in Connection with Retail Sales of Tangible Personal
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Property" (R. 102-103). In substance,I 0 the concept of the
\ast paragraph of former Regulation 58 was incorporated into
present Regulation 51, to-wit:
"Dealers who sell tangible personal property and
also agree to install the same on real property should
segregate the full retail selling price of such property
from the charge for installation as the tax applies only
to the retail price of the property. If the retailer fails
to make such segregation on the customer's invoice,
the sales tax applies to the entire contract price, including installation charges.
"Retailers and dealers who enter into agreements of
the type referred to above include such persons as
dealers in awnings, draperies, window shades, heating
equipment, carpeting, linoleum, show cases, electric
fixtures and similar retailers."

If defendant intends to rely upon its own regulations, it
properly should select the right one (the one in effect at the
time in question) . Even if defendant chooses to suggest that
its current Regulation 58 is retroactive, it properly should cite
Regulation 51.

3.
Plaintiff Sells Both Under Lump Sum and Non Lump
Sum Contracts
Taken literally, Regulation 58, both in its pertinent and
present form, identifies two types of contracts into which a
seller who installs may enter: (A) lump sum contracts, wherein
sales price and installation price are "lumped" into a single
IOChief auditor Holt preferred to state that the verbiage was "similar" (R. 2728).
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sum; (B) non lump sum contracts, wherein there are separate
agreements as to, respectively, the amount of the sales price
-aed tae affiount- af the saleS" price and the amount of the
installation price. It is undisputed that plaintiff enters into
both types of contracts (R. 44).
Pertinent and present Regulation 58 says, as to this type
of dealer: "In case a contractor enters into both of the above
kinds of contracts, he shall be deemed to be a retailer of tangible
personal property . . . " (Emphasis supplied). If plaintiff is
a retailer, as the Regulations specify, he cannot be a consumer,
for both the sales tax act and the use tax act define a retailer
as a seller to the consumer, 59-15-2(e), 59-16-2(f), U.C.A.,
(1953).
Under the plain meaning of Regulation 58, therefore,
defendant should have deemed plaintiff a retailer, not a consumer, and instructed its auditors to withdraw the instant
assessment. 11 This Court should now do so.

4.
Defendant's Regulations Do Not Purport to Make
Plaintiff a Consumer

Insofar as plaintiff has been
other than ipse dixit, employed
plaintiff's liability, it is this: ( 1)
emplacement, become fixtures; (2)

able to discern any theory,
by defendant in asserting
the pump assemblies, upon
therefore, within the mean-

llChief a~dito~· Holt would have objecte? to the instruction, for at hearing he indicated his belief that the language relative to both kinds of contracts related to a
co~1tract ~f sale followed by a. contract to install (R. 26-27). This is, of course,
ne1ther kmd of contract prevwu~ly defined by the regulation. It is a separate
contract of sale, followed by a hiatus, followed by a contract to install.
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ing of applicable Regulation 58 and present Regulations 58
and 51, the pump assembly does not remain a chattel; ( 3)
therefore, plaintiff is a "contractor" who has contracted, under
lump sum contract, "for erection ... on, or otherwise improving
real property of others·'; ( 4) therefore, plaintiff is a consumer.
In the process of this theory, defendant is forced to disregard
the "both lump sum and non lump sum" provisions of its
regulations.
The theory is untenable on at least two counts.
The first fallacy of the theory is that, if it is applied, the
regulations, either pertinent or present, are internally inconsistent. It is true enough that they speak in terms of chattels,
but they then proceed to illustrate what is meant. According
both to the pertinent regulation• and its present counterparts,
a seller, lump sum or not, is a retailer, not a consumer, when
he "merely agrees to sell and install a complete unit of equipment under conditions whereby such unit does remain a
chattel." As illustrations, however, the regulation specifies,
among others, ''an electrical shop sells electrical fixtures and
agrees to attach them; . . . a retailer sells an oil burner or
heating equipment and contracts to install the same; a dealer
sells linoleum and agrees to lay it; a cabinet maker sells show
cases, counters and cabinets and agrees to install them; a
retailer sells a sprinkling system and agrees to install it." The
pertinent regulation then adds, as if to emphasize, " (a) person
performing such contracts is primarily a retailer of tangible
personal property . . . " The language in current Regulation
51 is somewhat more brief, but to substantially the same effect.
After indicating that, in certain contracts, a retailer may "sell
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tangible personal property and also agree to install the same
on real property'' and still remain retailers (that is, not be
primarily liable for tax), the illustrations of " ( r) etailers and
dealers who enter into agreements of the type referred to
above" include, among others, dealers in heating equipment.
carpeting, linoleum, show. cases, electric fixtures, and simila.
retailers.
The inconsistency of defendant's construction of the regulations is that the items mentioned therein (electric fixtures,
heating equipment, linoleum, show cases, etc.) are ones which
have been held, under the facts of the case, to be fixtures, or,
put another way, to have lost their legal status as chattels upon
installation, Anno., 55 A.L.R. 2d 1044; 22 Am fur Fixtures
§§ 49, 55, 58. If, therefore, the regulations are taken at face
value, they are self-defeating. They do not make sense, for
they identify as illustrations of chattels items which may very
well be, under the facts of a given case, fixtures. To construe
the regulations as defendant apparently would have them
construed, is to place them in a position in which this Court
must disregard them because they are indefinite, uncertain,
inconsistent, muddled and confused, hence inoperative, Toronto
v. Sheffield, 118 Utah 460, 222 P.2d 594, 600, 604 (1950),
and authorities there cited.
The second fallacy of the theory is that it apparently seeks
to substitute a "fixture" test for the "consumer" test decreed
by the legislature. In short, defendant's apparent theory is
that it need only determine that goods installed on realty are
"fixtures," that is that they lose their character as "chattels"
and that it need not determine whether the person so installing
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

is, in fact a consumer or whether the items in question (here
pump assemblies) have lost their identity as such. As noted
previously, defendant has no power to impose tax liability
upon a person who does not fall within the legislative imposition of liability, in this case upon a person who is not a
consumer. Any attempt to do so by defendant is nugatory,
for it is beyond defendant's power.
The fallacies inherent in defendant's theory, however~
point to the proper construction of the pertinent regulation
(and, for that matter, the present ones).
It is relatively dear that the pertinent Regulation 58 and
its successors were drafted upon the basis of Utah Concrete

Pt"oducts Corp. They are best construed in the light of that
decision. It will be recalled that, at 125 P.2d 410, this Court
noted that the road and building contractors there in question
were not reselling the products "in their original form," but
for the "purpose of changing their very nature from personal
to real property," that is to produce "a new entity"; again, at
125 P.2d 411, this Court spoke in terms of the products being
incorporated into "a separate entity" and of losing "their
identity as such." Regulation 58, unfortunately, appears in
its emphasis upon "chattels" to pluck from context the language about the change of nature from personal to real property,
dropping the key word "very" and the key term "new entity."
When read in context, Utah Concrete Products Corp.
speaks in terms of consumption when personal property becomes
real property as a m,ttter of law, whatever the facts of the case.
That is to say, when reasonable men could not disagree, despite
the facts adduced, as to whether personalty had become realty
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through incorporation in a new entit-y, the incorporator is the
consumer.
If the verbiage in defendant's regulations relative to
chattels is read in this light, it makes sense, for (with the
possible exception of ;sprinkling systems, fortuitously deleted
from present Regulation 51) the items mentioned in the
illustration have each been held, if the facts in evidence permit,
to be other than fixtures, Anno., 55 A.L.R. 2d 1044; 22 Am.
fur., Fixtures §§55, 68, 61.

Whether these illustrative items are fixtures is, in other
words, under inconclusive facts, a mixed question of law and
fact to be decided by a jury or other finder of fact, upon which
a decision may be rendered either way, 22 Am. fur., Fixtures
§77, pp. 798-99. On the other hand, there are certain instances
when the item in question becomes realty as a matter of law,
whatever the factual context of the case. As might be expected,
this is where, as in Utah Concrete Products Corp., "the chattel
is so affixed to the realty that its identity is lost, or where it
cannot be removed without material injury to the realty or to
itself . . . " (emphasis supplied), Bay State York Co. v.
.Marvix, 331 Mass. 407, 119 N.E. 2d 727, 43 A.L.R. 2d 1373,
1377 (1954).
It is submitted that defendant's regulations are consistent,
both in internal context and with the Legislative mandate and
this Court's decisions, if-but only if-they are read to mean
that the sale and installation of a chattel is, for sales and use
tax purposes, a retail sale unless the chattel installed becomes
a part of the real estate as a matter of law., whatever the undisputed facts.
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\v' ater pumps, when emplaced and whatever the facts,
certainly are not a part of the real estate as a matter of law.
To the contrary, they have been held to remain personalty
after emplacement, Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Morgan,
42 Kan. 23, 21 Pac. 809 ( 1889). It has been demonstrated
previously that plaintiff, in the subject transactions, was not
a consumer within the definitions afforded by Utah decisions,
including Utah Concrete Products Corp. It should be added
that the undisputed testimony is that no damage is caused to
the real estate when a pump is removed (R. 54), that a given
well can receive various sized pumps (R. 95), and that a given
pump can be removed from a well and resold for use in another
well (R. 56).

Under pertinent and present regulations, as properly construed, plaintiff is not a consumer. If such regulations are not
interpreted as suggested they are void because inconsistent
and because their promulgation is beyond the power of
defendant.

s.
Defendant's Theory Does Not Make Plaintiff a Consumer
Even if defendant's regulations are read as defendant
apparently would have them read (that is, by assuming the
legal validity of the "fixture" test, and by deleting the "both
lump sum and non lump sum" contract provision and the
illustrations as to chattels), plaintiff was not a consumer. Even
if the "fixture" test is adopted, the evidence of record establishes
beyond any doubt which might be entertained by reasonable
men that the pump assemblies in question remained chattels
after emplacement.
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The tests for determining whether an article becomes a
"fixture" were set forth succinctly by this Court in Workman
tJ. Henrie, 71 Utah 400, 266 Pac. 1033, 1035, 58 A.L.R. 1346
(1928):

"In considering whether a structure annexed to land
is itself legally a part of the land, the chief determining
factors are the mode of attachment or annexation, the
character of the structure and the intention of the
person making the annexation, which generally is regarded as the most important or controlling factor,
and the mode of annexation and the character of the
structure merely as evidence on the question of intention.''
The evidence shows:

(1) As to intention. Neither the seller, the buyer nor the
buyer's consulting engineer intend that the water pump shall
constitute a permanent addition to the well. To the contrary,
they all contemplate that its removal will be necessary for one
or more of the five reasons set forth heretofore. Objectively,
engineers plan water well construction to facilitate pump
removal, buyers assume that pump houses have a hatch so
removal can be effected and plaintiff, when emplacing pumps,
lubricates the platform so that it will not be cemented by the
grouting to the foundation. Additionally, plaintiff, in its
private dealings, utilizes conditional sale contracts and has
repossessed thereunder, but has neved filed a mechanic's lien
-once more an objective fact which demonstrates an intention
that pumps remain personalty. Moreover, the very fact that
plaintiff has not paid the excise taxes levied on consumers, but
has charged sales tax to private buyers, coupled with assurances
from public purchasers that no tax liability would accrue, is
an objective indication of intent.
34
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(2) As to annexation: Pumps are annexed so passingly
to the realty that no damage thereto is done when they are
removed. Although pumps are objects of considerable weight,
all parties concerned are aware that plaintiff has (as do other
dealers) facilities by which to remove them with relative ease.
Constructive annexation, based upon unique suitability for
the real estate, is not applicable. A pump can service any of a
number of wells. A well can be served by any of a number
of pumps.
(3) Character of the object: A pump, unlike auditor Buttalph's
doors and windows (footnote &) , is a machine with moving
parts which experiences considerable wear. Its life span in
Utah is, at most 20 years, and probably less. It is recommended
that pumps be removed every 5-7 years for a prev~ntive maintenance check, and more frequent removal, for one of the
reasons before recited, is likely.
The language of Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture, supra, is
once again in point. It is clear that the pumps in question, after
emplacement, remained chattels. This could not be doubted by
reasonable men. It is significant that defendant's decision
contains no finding relative to the issue of fixtures. Even under
defendant's apparent theory, plaintiff was not a consumer.

6.
Defendant Erred in Not Allowing Cross-Examination and
Not Admitting Exhibit 15 for Identification.

As just noted, plaintiff's non-payment of the tax required
\\·ere it a consumer and its collection from private customers
of sales tax is an objective indication of the intent that pumps,

35
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

after emplacement, remain personalty. Defendant's refusal to
allow plaintiff to cross-examine regarding uniform trade
practice in this regard (R. 36-3 7) and its refusal to admit
a stipulation to the effect that other dealers, experts in the
field, have uniformly considered sale and emplacement of
pumps to be retail sales of personal property (R. 74-75, 122,
Ex. 15) constituted error. As noted at 20 Am. fur., Evidence
§334, p. 311, custom or usage is properly admissible in order
to ascertain the intention of parties to a contract. In this case,
a pertinent issue, if defendant's own theory is adopted, was
and is the intention of the parties to a contract as to the
character of the goods thereafter. Uniform trade practice,
custom and opinion is of importance to these issues. Defendant
erred. Such evidence should be considered by this Court.

II.
PENALTIES WERE IMPROPERLY ASSESSED.

A.
PLAINTIFF WAS NEITHER NEGLIGENT NOR INTENTIONALLY
DISREGARDFUL OF AUTHORIZED RULES AND REGULATIONS WITH
KNOWLEDGE THEREOF.

Defendant has assessed plaintiff not only with a tax deficiency, but also with penalties (including 12% per annum
interest) thereon. The statutory provisions in point are 59-15-S
and 59-16-9, U.C.A. (1953).
Ordinarily, if deficiency exists, interest at 6% per annum
is charged from the time the return was due. If, ho'"'~'ever, the
36
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deficiency, or any part thereof, is due to negligence or intentional disregard of authorized rules and regulations with
t\:nowledge thereof, a flat 10% penalty, plus an additional 6%
per annum interest, is charged. Although in its decision
defendant made no finding that plaintiff's failure was due to
negligence or intentional disregard of authorized rules and
regulations with knowledge thereof, defendant affirmed the
imposition of penalties.
The purported reason why the auditing department
originally imposed the penalties is fairly apparent from the
record. Chief auditor Holt was of the opinion that failure to
report use tax liability on the transactions in question, inasmuch
as the liability, according to him, was "clear cut," was sufficient
indication of neglect or intentional disregard (R. 22-24). Mr.
Holt, who did not go through plaintiff's books (R. 22), who
did not visit the wells in question, who had not talked to
persons and firms in the pump business, and who had not talked
either to buyers or engineers (R. 29), had depended upon the
report of auditor Buttalph (R. 24). Auditor Buttalph had
never examined the pumps in question, but asserted familiarity
with pumps in general; he claimed to have talked with engineers, but not the ones involved in the instant transactions;
he had not talked to the buyers in question (R. 35-37).
Why defendant affirmed such assessment of penalty
(including augmented interest) is less clear. As noted, there
is no finding in support. Some indication would have been
appreciated by plaintiff, particularly in view of the following
statement of the hearing officer (and the only member of
the bar on the Commission), which statement was made without
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objection from any Commission member, all of whom were
present:
COMMISSIONER SMART: I think that you have
made your case, that the penalty in this case based upon
willful neglect or negligence is an improper charge.
I feel you have made your case in respect to that inasmuch as there is primarily in dispute here a question
as to whether this sale to a tax exempt organization,
as to whether or not a reasonable doubt in the mind
of the Nickerson Pump Company as to whether it was
actually taxable and as to the penalty. I think you
have made your case and I am sure that the Commission will agree that in any event that would be waived
regardless of the outcome with respect to the other

... (R. 36).
It seems clear that there is not any rational basis upon
which plaintiff may be found to have been negligent or intentionally disregardful of authorized rules and regulations of
which it had notice. As to the specification of tax at Exhibit A,
Schedule 1 of the deficiency notice, there is no evidence whatever. Surely negligence or intentional disregard cannot be
presumed. From the sums involved, it would appear that
bookkeeping errors were involved at the average of slightly
over 5 a year, less than one a month. Defendant would be
ill-advised to label this wrongdoing. If it is, what of auditor
Buttalph who on the instant audit made four admitted errors
(R. 4, 10-12, 108), two more errors stipulated to at hearing
(R. 21, 22), and another error apparent on the face of the
record (R. 60) ? Insofar as the bulk of the deficiency is concerned, Commissioner Smart's summary, quoted heretofore,
adequately expresses plaintiff's view. In view of the status of
the law, of the status of the Commission's regulations, of the
38
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assurances of tax exemption from public buyers and, apparently, of a prior contrary practical interpretation by defendant,
plaintitc·s failure to pay the asserted tax is precisely what one
would expect of a reasonable man. If this is a proper case for
imposition of penalties, one wonders what case is not.
A test exists for determination of negligence or intentional
disregard. Mr. Nickerson's stipulated testimony was that he
had regularly directed his bookkeeper to file sales and use tax
returns as required (R. 43). If such bookkeeper had access to
all files examined by auditor Buttolph, was the bookkeeper
negligent or intentionally disregardful of authorized rules and
regulations of which he had knowledge so that, if the decision
of this Court is adverse, plaintiff herein many recover its loss
from its bookkeeper? A similar test might be formulated.
Assume that prior to July 1, 1955, Mr. Nickerson contacted
an attorney, who advised him to treat the transactions, from
the tax standpoint, as they were treated. Would such attorney,
in the event of an adverse decision, be held liable to plaintiff
because of negligence or intentional disregard? The answer
to both questions is clearly no. The penalties (including augmented interest) are improper.

B.
DEFENDANT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING CROSS-EXAMINATION
AND NOT ADMITTING EXHIBIT 15 FOR IDENTIFICATON.

This matter has been considered relative to the intention
facet of the fixture issue. The matter of penalties raises a
question of whether plaintiff was negligent. It is well estab-
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lished that trade custom may be introduced or elicited in order
to establish a standard of care, 1 Jones on Evidence (Fifth
Edition) §192. The fact that all plaintiff's competitors treated
like transactions in the same manner as did plaintiff was of
importance. The cross-examination should have been allowed
and the evidence admitted. The hearing officer apparently
would have allowed the testimony and evidence, had he considered the matter of penalties open to dispute (R. 36, 37).
Failure to do so was error, which this Court may purge by
affording the evidence due consideration in its review of the
facts herein.

III.
CERTAIN TERMS OF THE ASSESSMENT WERE INCORRECTLY IMPOSED.
The following list deals with errors in the deficiency notice
prepared by defendant's auditors (R. 108, Ex. 1) and affirmed
by defendant. Even if defendant's decision is otherwise affirmed,
defendant should be ordered to correct them.
1. The amount upon which tax was based was amended

and reduced, by stipulation at hearing by the amount of $239.59
(R. 21-22). The decision did not reflect this stipulation and
reduction.
2. Even if defendant's apparent theory is correct, all items

attributable to Midvale City, No. 8833 (R. 60-61) should be
eliminated. According to the undisputed evidence, neither a
lump sum, nor a separately itemized contract was entered into
in this transaction. Rather, two separate contracts, with a hiatus
40
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in time between them, were entered into, one for sale and the

other for installation.
3. Defendant erred in its computation of sales tax penalties
at Exhibit A of Exhibit 1 (R. 108). It assessed the penalties
year by year, resulting in two years wherein the statutory
minimum of $2.50 rather than 10% was applied. 59-15-8
U.C.A. ( 1953) makes the minimum applicable only to the
entire deficiency, not on a year by year basis.
4. Assuming arguendo the correctness of defendant's
apparent theory, plaintiff is responsible for sales tax on all
goods title to which passed to it in Utah and is responsible for
use tax on all goods title to which passed to it outside Utah.
Regulation 31, both before and after its 1956 amendment,
rules that: ''If the contract of sale requires the seller to deliver
the goods to the buyer at a particular place or to pay the freight
or cost of transportation to the buyer at a particular place,
title to the property does not pass until the goods have been
so delivered to the buyer or have reached the place agreed
upon" (R. 102). In this case all materials, save those from
Cutler Hammer, are shipped postage prepaid by the seller.
Byron Jackson, however, stipulates that title passes F.O.B. its
factory, California, and both Byron Jackson and Aurora provide
specialty goods (goods to order), thereby passing title outside
Utah upon appropriation to the contract, 60-2-3 ( 4) (a),
U.C.A. ( 1953). As to all materials save those purchased from
Cutler-Hammer, Byron Jackson and Aurora and listed at
Schedule 4, title passed to plaintiff within, not without Utah.
The use tax as to those items is incorrectly assessed. They should
be deleted from the assessment.
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff was not, under the largely stipulated and undisputed evidence, a consumer of the water pumps in question.
Water pumps are consumed or exhausted through the wear
entailed in pumping water, not through emplacement by
plaintiff. Neither does plaintiff's emplacement of such pumps
create a new entity. Neither is plaintiff a consumer under
defendant's regulations nor under its apparent theory.
Judgment should be entered for plaintiff with, as in
Western Leather & Finding Co., costs awarded to it.
Respectfully submitted,
Kent Shearer
Earl M. Wunderli
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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